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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACTs-FILING--NOTICE TO ATTACHING CREDITORS OF
VFNDmE-The plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, licensed to do business in Illi-
nois and Wisconsin held a conditional sales agreement covering a truck sold in
Illinois. The vendee, contrary to a provision of the agreement, removed its truck
permanently into Wisconsin. A Wisconsin creditor of the vendee caused the
truck to be seized on attachment in Wisconsin. The conditional sales agreement
was not recorded in any Wisconsin filing district. The plaintiff did not know
where the truck was until the day before the creditor seized it. Two days after
seizure the plaintiff notified the creditor of its claim; but the plaintiff did not
file its conditional sales agreement. The creditor would not release the truck.
The plaintiff brought an action to recover possession. Held, by failing to file a
copy of the conditional sales agreement as prescribed by statute, the plaintiff had
lost protection against the attaching creditor. Universal Credit Co. v. Finn,
(Wis., 1933) 250 N.W. 391.
Section 14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, sec. 122.14, Wis. Stats.,
gives protection to the foreign vendor against subsequent local purchasers or
attaching local creditors of the vendee, providing the vendor files a copy of his
agreement within ten days after discovering the whereabouts of the chattel. The
particular situation presented in the instant case has seldom arisen since the
passage of the Uniform Act. The Wisconsin court purported to follow Thayer
Mercantile Co. v. First National Bank, 98 N.J.L. 29, 119 Atl. 94 (1922). In that
case, too, the vendor had failed to file a copy of his sales agreement, although
he had given the attaching creditor notice of his claim within the ten day period.
Perhaps a literal interpretation of the statute requires the construction which the
court has given it. However, the Wisconsin court has seen fit to protect the
foreign vendor who has not filed a copy of his contract, but who has given
notice to the local attaching creditor, where the vendee has brought the car into
the state on a pleasure trip, without intending permanently to change the situs
of the chattel. Forgan v. Smedal, 203 Wis. 564, 234 N.W. 896 (1931). And the
West Virginia court has upheld the foreign vendor against a purchaser from
the vendee who lad already purchased before the vendor notified him, where the
vendor gave actual notice but never "recorded" a copy of the contract within
ten days after discovering the whereabouts of the chattel. Banks-Miller Supply
Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W.Va. 583, 146 S.E. 521 (1929).
Perhaps the court might suggest something to distinguish the case concern-
ing the subsequent purchaser from that of the attaching creditor. The purchaser
has acted; recording or filing after a demand upon him would be useless. The
attaching creditor is claiming a potential lien which he can make effective unless
the vendor complies literally with the statute.
ROSALIE A. BYER.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS-POLICE POW-
ER-MORtGAGE MoRAToRIuM.-Defendants appeal from a judgment affirmed by
the Minnesota Supreme Court, 249 N.W. 893 (1933), which granted the peti-
tioners an extension of the period of redemption. This case was decided on the
authority of Blaisdell et al. v. Homne Building and Loan Ass'n., (Minn., 1933)
249 N.W. 334; see, Recent Decisions, 18 Marq. Law Rev. 55 (1933). The latter
case sustained the validity of an act of the Legislature which authorized an ex-
tension of the redemption period during the present emergency, but in no event
beyond May 1, 1935, after a foreclosure sale. Under this act the court was to
RECENT DECISIONS
determine the reasonable value of the income, or reasonable rental value, and
was to direct the mortgagor to apply the. determined amount toward payment of
taxes, insurance, interest and mortgage indebtedness, in the manner to be de-
termined by the court. Held, the Minnesota statute as applied in the instant case
does not violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution; neither does it
violate the due process or equal protection of the law clauses. Homne Building
and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell et ux., 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934).
The Minnesota Court frankly admitted that the law impaired the obligation
of contracts, but that it was justified as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The United States Supreme Court does not unqualifiedly subscribe to that view,
stating that "the statute does not impair the integrity of the mortgage indebted-
ness," since there remains the obligation for interest, and the rental value must be
paid, by reason of which the mortgagee has, so far as that value is concerned, the
equivalent of possession during the extended period; he can still foreclose and
obtain a deficiency judgment if the mortgagor fails to redeem within the pre-
scribed period. "Aside from the extension of time, the other conditions of the
mortgage are unaltered." The Supreme Court also takes cognizance of the eco-
nomic fact that mortgagees are not concerned with obtaining property, but with
obtaining reasonable protection for their investment security, and thereby con-
cludes that the statute is designed to protect the interest of mortgagees as well
a's that of mortgagors. "The legislation seeks to prevent the impending ruin of
both by a considerate measure of relief."
The prohibition of the contract clause is not an absolute one, and is not to
be too strictly construed. " * * * to assign to contracts, universally, a literal pur-
port, and to exact from them a rigid literal fulfillment, coild not have been the
intent of the constitution." Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 286, 6 L.Ed. 606
(1827). Thtus the remedy provided in the contract may be altered without im-
pairing the obligation of the contract. "The distinction between the obligation of
a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation,
has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things." Sturges v. Crown-
inshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819). " * * * it is competent for the
States to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they see
fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired."
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 553, 18 L.Ed. 403 (1866). This
control over remedial processes has been retained by the states, and by this, the
constitution is qualified, as well as by t.he authority of the state to safeguard the
vital interests of its people. And, it is stated by the Court, that "not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the par-
ties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." Thus, it may be inferred that
the Court is of the opinion that the parties have no cause for complaint if the
state has exercised its power to change the remedy, since the possible exercise
of that power had by inference become an implied part of the contract, to which
the parties were subject.
The controlling factor in the decision is that the mortgagee is to receive the
benefits arising from the property, even though he is not put in immediate pos-
session. The statute has sought to safeguard the interests of the mortgagee-
purchaser, which was not done in other similar statutes that have been held in-
valid. See, Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L.Ed. 143 (1843) ; Barnitz v. Bev-
erly, 163 U.S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042, 41 L.Ed. 93 (1896).
For a discussion of this law aS a valid exercise of the state's police power,
see, Recent Decisions, 18 Marq. Law Rev. 55 (1933).
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